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STATEMENT OF CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE

The parties were divorced by stipulated decree in March, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 48. The
parties have two children, C.B. born in 2002 (age 12) and B.B., born in 2005 (age 8Yz), who
were always in the primary care of their mother, who is a homemaker.
The parties' decree contains a specific provision providing a 100-mile radius of
father's ranch near Sweet, Idaho, outside of which moves with the children require mutual
agreement or court order. R. Vol. I, p. 59.
The children's father, Defendant Jeff Biggers (hereinafter "Jeff') filed for custody,
claiming that a "sudden" move with the children by Plaintiff Emily Suter (hereinafter
"Emily"), was wrongful, even though within the 100-mile allowance. R. Vol. II, p. 253.
Emily, a stay-home mom, and the kids' primary custodian, did move with her husband and
four children, to Lake Fork, south of McCall, from a ranch property outside Emmett, at the
end of May, 2013, when the kids finished school in Emmett.

II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
There have been extensive post-divorce proceedings between these parties, including
multiple motions to modifY, motions for contempt, and related proceedings. But their original
divorce was entered by stipulation, in March, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 46.
Emily, always a stay-at-home mom, received primary custody of C.B. and B. B. in the
agreed divorce, and Jeff received alternating-weekend visitation, plus two nights during the
week, plus extended summer periods and holidays, although the decree provides for joint legal
and physical custody. R. Vol. I, pp. 48-63.
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During their marriage, both parties said they around considerably, living in the Boise,
Canyon, Gem and Valley County areas; the kids attended several different schools between
Kindergarten and sixth grade for C.B., and Kindergarten and third grade for B.B., moving
among schools in Sweet, Horseshoe Bend and Emmett. Tr. Vol I, pp. 103-1 04; Tr. Vol. II, pp.
235-237; Tr. Vol. II, p. 341, 1. 1-9.
After the divorce in 2011, Emily and the kids moved to a ranch acreage her family
owned at Letha, which is just west of Emmett, and the kids attended schools in Emmett
proper. Tr. Vol. I, p. 91, 11. 10-12; Tr. Vol. II, p. 378, 1. 24-p. 380, 1. 25. Jeff remained at the
large secluded ranch owned by his father, on Brownlee Road, above Sweet, which is actually
in Boise County. R. Vol. I, p. 91 (Exhibit B-2 of Order ModifYing Decree of Divorce, entered
by agreement in October, 2011); Tr. Vol. II, pp. 234-235; Tr. Vol. II, pp. 362-363. That's
where the parties lived at the time of the original divorce, and the reason the divorce was
originally filed in Boise County.
The parties' stipulated divorce decree contains the following provision:
10. RELOCATIONBYPARENT
We agree that a move by either parent of more than 100 miles from
Sweet, ID 83670 will make this plan impractical or unworkable. Therefore,
neither parent will make such a move with a child without our mutual
agreement or a decision by the court that it is in the child's best interest to
move.
Decree ofDivorce entered Mar. 29,2011, Exh. A. (Amended Parenting Plan), R. Vol. I, p. 59.
In May 2012, Emily filed a modification action (hereinafter "20 12 Modification"),
asking to relocate the children with her to Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, beyond the 100 mile limit
stated in the divorce decree, primarily for improved employment opportunities for her
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husband. R. Vol. I, pp. 93-100. Jeff opposed any move, and after a trial in Idaho City (Boise
County), Emily's request was denied, but Emily retained primary custody, and Jeff's visitation
was actually reduced, to four nights a month (two weekends) plus a summer block and holiday
time. R. Vol. I, pp. 135-139. The magistrate who heard that matter (Hon. Roger Cockerille)
found that Jeff's behavior toward Emily had been "harassing and intimidating" (R. Vol. I, p.
137); Emily had "always been the primary caregiver of the children" (R. p. 137); and Jeff's
conduct had been "foolish and immature" towards Clint Suter, the children's step-father (R. p.
138). Although not allowing the children to move outside the 100 mile limit set in the original
divorce, the court reduced Jeff's visitation to just four overnights a month during the school
year and significantly increased his child support. R. p. 148 and R. p. 166. The court
specifically left all other provisions of the original decree intact, including the 100 mile
provision. R. p. 148.
Almost immediately (3 months later), Jeff filed a modification petition asking to
reduce his child support. R. p. 171, Petition for Modification filed March 21, 2013. Emily
answered and counterclaimed for clarification ofthe holiday and summer schedule. R. Vol. II,
pp. 232-234. Jeff had also filed contempt against Emily based on a conflict between the
holiday schedule and the weekend schedule.
Jeff then sought and was granted a change of venue to Gem County in April2013.
R. Vol. II, p. 249. The case was transferred to the Third Judicial District. R. Vol. II, pp. 232238.
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While Jeff's original modification was pending, Emily and her husband moved their
residence (at the end of May 2013) to Lake Fork Gust south ofMcCall), well within the 100
mile limit from Sweet designated in the custody decree. Tr. Vol. I, p. 76, ll. 7-16.
Jeff then amended his modification action to seek primary custody based on Emily's
move. R. Vo. II. pp. 331-333. In June, Jeff also filed multiple counts of contempt against
Emily for alleged violations of the custody order, including specifically for "moving from the
area with the parties' children ... in violation of the Court's decree ... entered March 29,
2011." R.Vol.II,p.261.
Later, on August 16, 2013,just before school started in McCall, Jeff filed for
temporary orders, seeking temporary custody because he wanted the kids to go to school in
Emmett. R. Vol. II, p. 269.
Emily responded that the children had been living in Lake Fork for several months by
that time, and were looking forward to school there, and she had been exchanging the children
at Smith's Ferry all summer without incident, which was only 8 miles further from Jeff's
house than the previous exchange point they'd used when the kids lived in Letha. R. Vol. II,
p. 289-293.
The court, based only on the affidavit of Jeff's attorney (R. Vol. II, pp. 271-274) and
argument, entered temporary orders which required the children to be re-enrolled back in
Emmett, while continuing Emily's primary custody. R. Vol. II, pp. 343-344.
Trial was then held on Jeff's modification over a two-day period (November 21, 2013
and January 9, 2014). The court bifurcated the evidence and first heard Jeff's contempt
motion. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 7-74. The court dismissed all of Jeff's counts of contempt except for
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one part of his "count 4" for failing to provide a specific address to Jeff. Tr. Vol. I, p. 71, ll
11-24. 1
The trial concluded on January 9, 2014, and the court issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on January 28,2014. R. Vol. III, pp. 404-415. A "Third Modified
Decree" was entered February 10, 2014, and Emily applied for an order allowing permissive
appeal on February 11, 2014. An order allowing permissive appeal was entered by the
magistrate March 10,2014. R. Vol. III, p. 441. Timely request was made to the Supreme
Court pursuant to Rule 11 (8)(2) Idaho Appellant Rules, for an Order Granting Motion for
Acceptance of Permissive Appeal, which motion was granted April2, 2014.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Emily and Jeffs two children (hereinafter "the boys") are ages 12 and 8. C.B. just
finished

6th

grade, and B.B.just finished 3rd grade. Tr. Vol. I, p. 104,11. 1-3. Before the

parties' divorced in 2011, C.B. has started school in Sweet (kindergarten) and then went to
Horseshoe Bend for a year or so. B.B. started school in Sweet as well, before changing to
elementary school in Emmett. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 103-104. The parties had always moved around.
Tr. Vol. II, p. 340, L. 15-p. 341, L. 9.

1

In its ruling on the contempts, the court specifically dismissed Jeff's claim that Emily's
move with the children had violated the custody order. Tr. Vol. I, p. 65, L 23-p. 66, L. 6. The Court
stated:
Specifically, there's been no evidence whatsoever that moving to McCall is
over 100 miles away from Sweet so I will go ahead and dismiss Count 3 at this time
on a Rule 29 motion.
Count 4, I will strike relocating with the parties' children. There's been,
again, no evidence that that is contrary to the Court's decree of divorce because
there's been no testimony or evidence as to the distance between Sweet and McCall.
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The parties had specifically contemplated moves of the children within a specific
radius (100 miles) of Jeff's family's mountain ranch, likely due to the rural nature of the entire
area. R. Vol. I, pp. 48-63. Their decree provides:
10. RELOCATION BY PARENT
We agree that a move by either parent of more than 100 miles from
Sweet, ID 83670 will make this plan impractical or unworkable. Therefore,
neither parent will make such a move with a child without our mutual
agreement or a decision by the court that it is in the child's best interest to
move. We agree that a new parent plan will be made if a moves occurs.
Decree of Divorce entered Mar. 29, 2011, Exh. A. (Amended Parenting Plan), R. p. 59.
In April2013, Emily and her husband, Clint Suter, were looking for alternatives to
staying in Letha, just west ofEmmett. Tr. Vol. I, p. 76, 11. 7-16. They had asked to be able to
move to distances beyond the 100-mile limit in the decree, which Jeff had consistently refused
to consider, and which had been declined in the prior modification request in 2013. R. Vol. I,
p. 135-139.
Their main motivation was to enable Clint, Emily's husband, to find employment
closer to home instead ofhaving to commute to North Dakota. Tr. Vol. II, p. 314,11. 17-22;
Tr. Vol. II, p. 319,11. 12-16. In the McCall area, Clint was able to find full-time employment
at Brundage Mountain Resort, which provides significant benefits, such as full medical
insurance for the family including dental and vision. Tr. Vol. II, p. 303, L. 21-p. 304, L. 18.
Prior to that time last year, the children had no had medical insurance. Jeff testified he didn't
have it and paid "with cash" for health care. Tr. Vol. II, p. 361, L. 22-p. 362, L. 5.
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Clint's income allows Emily to continue as a full-time homemaker and care provider
to her family

a role she's had since C.B. and B.B. were born. Tr. Vol. II, p. 305,11. 11-15;

p. 368, L. 21-p. 369, L. 4.
Jeff, on the other hand, who is provided his home on his father's ranch property (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 362, 11. 15-16) testified that he prefers not to work (he has an excavation business),
so he can stay at the ranch and "spend more time with my kids." Tr. Vol. II, p. 363, 11. 1-6.
He admitted he's not paid for "helping on the ranch" but prefers being there. He testified he
can take the time to drive the 25-30 miles one-way to Emmett to see the boys at school
regularly during the work days. Tr. Vol. II, p. 120, 11. 3-6; Tr. Vol. II, p. 234, 11. 11-17; Tr.
Vol. II, p. 205, L. 17-p. 206, L. 22.
There was testimony that, in fact, Jeff is able to regularly go visit the boys at their
respective schools during the week, despite the fact that his actual visitation under the custody
order only gives him two weekends a month (Tr. Vol. I, p. 188, 11. 1-5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 133, L.
22-p. 134, L. 12; p. 139, 11. 11-18), and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered
by Judge Cockerille on October 24, 2012, specifically found: "It is in the children's best
interests to eliminate mid-week visitation altogether." R. Vol. I, p. 139.
One of Jeffs chief objections to the boys going to school in McCall was the "great
inconvenience" of having to drive further to visit the boys during the school week when they
would be in Emily's custody. Tr. Vol. II, p. 399, 11. 19-25; Tr. Vol. II, p. 205,11. 17-23;
p. 208, 11. 4-9. He also testified it would be a "lot ofhardship" to drive to McCall for parentteacher conferences or to go on field trips. Tr. Vol. II, p. 208, 11. 3-9. The testimony
established that the McCall schools were about 80 miles from Jeffs parents' ranch, whereas
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the Emmett schools are between 20 and 30 miles from the ranch. Tr. Vol. II, p. 205, 11. 17-23;
p. 234, L. 6-p. 235, L. 5.
Jeff admitted that his actual court-allotted visitation was only 4 days a month, and his
agreed-on exchange point for pickups and drop offs of the boys had gone from 20 miles to 28
miles- a difference of about 8 miles. Tr. Vol. II, p. 234, L. 17-p. 235, L. 5; p. 396, L. 12p. 397, L. 9; Tr. Vol. I, p. 115,11. 4-11.
Emily's Exhibit 217, admitted into evidence, showed the approximate distances and
the similarity between the travel from Jeffs ranch outside Horseshoe Bend to the prior
exchange place near Emmett (20 miles) and the new exchange the parties used at Smith's
Ferry (28 miles), after May, 2013. Tr. Vol. II, p. 396, L. 9.
Both parents testified they believed the boys were basically bright students (C.B. was
described as an excellent student). Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, 1. 17-23. There had been some issues
with C.B. 's mid-term grades, which Emily described, as partly owing to the transition to
junior high, and the introduction ofhomework. Tr. Vol. I, p. 111, ll. 12-p. 114, L. 5;
Plaintiffs Exh. 201; Defendant's Exhibits C and D; Tr. Vol. I, p. 21, ll. 8-16.
In support of her decision to move to the McCall area, Emily testified she felt the
divorce decree permitted her to move the children there, as it was within the 100-mile radius
of Sweet Idaho, near Jeffs ranch. Tr. Vol. II, p. 367, ll. 3-11. She testified at length about
doing careful research about the quality of schools in McCall, compared to Emmett, and what
she felt were superior ratings and test scores in McCall. Tr. Vol. II, p. 374, 11. 3-12.
Jeff testified at length primarily that the boys had friends at school and loved doing
ranch activities, on Dad's weekends and in the summer, such as calf branding, rodeo events,

BRIEF ON EXPEDITED APPEAL
OF APPELLANT EMILY SUTER, p. 8

horse back riding, and working with animals. Tr. Vol. I, p. 174,11. 20-21; p. 181, L. 83; Defs
Exh. AA, BB, CC and DD.
Jeff testified that if the boys went to school in McCall, they would lose their
friendships with the kids in Emmett, but the mother of the kids' closest friend testified her son
Tristan had gone to church camp with C.B. and B.B. in McCall for almost 2 weeks after
they'd moved there, and had a great time. Tr. Vol. II, p. 290, 11. 17-25; Tr. Vol. II, p. 232, 11.
5-17.
There was no expert testimony of any kind presented. A McCall police officer did
testifY how close his own kids had become to C.B. and B.B., from being neighbors of Emily
and Clint in Lake Fork. A school resource officer from McCall testified that he'd had C.B. in
his scout troop during the summer and how great a kid he is. Tr. Vol. II, p. 329, 11. 6-17. He
also testified that the McCall schools "rate very high" and his own kids were excited to attend
school and church with C.B. and B.B. Tr. Vol. II, p. 336, 11. 1-18.
As a result of the court's temporary order in August 2013, however, Emily was
required to re-enroll the kids back in the Emmett schools, despite having lived in Lake Fork
for several months by that time. Tr. Vol. II, p. 402, L. 17-p. 403, L. 14. To comply with the
order, she lived "out of a suitcase" at her parents' home in northwest Boise, during the school
weeks, and returned to their home in Lake Fork each weekend, when the kids didn't go to their
father's ranch. Tr. Vol. II, p. 403,11. 11-12. Her parents' residence, at 11431 West Hickory
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Loop, in northwest Boise, is about the same distance to Emmett as Jeff's parents' ranch on
Brownlee Road in Boise County. Tr. Vol. I, p. 155,11. 9-11; Tr. Vol. II, p. 272,11. 1-2. 2
The magistrate bifurcated the contempt and the modification trials, but stated the court
would consider all the contempt evidence as applicable to the modification. At several stages
of the proceeding, the magistrate, seemed to go back and forth- viewing the case as a
"relocation" case, and then at other times applying the 100-mile move provision in the original
decree. Tr. Vol. I, p. 195, 11. 13-14 (For example, at the end of the first day oftrial, the Court
stated: "[R]elocation and transition is the ultimate issue for this Court's consideration."); Tr.
Vol. I, p. 65, L. 23-p. 66, L. 6 (However, in dismissing Jeff's contempts based on the move,
the court said: "Specifically, there's been no evidence whatsoever that moving to McCall is
over 100 miles away from Sweet so I will go ahead and dismiss Count 3 [of the contempt] at
this time on a Rule 29 motion. Count 4, I will strike relocating with the parties' children.
There's been, again, no evidence that this is contrary to the Court's Decree of Divorce because
there's been no testimony or evidence as to the distance between Sweet and McCall")
The court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 28, 2014. R.
Vol. III, pp. 404-420. Despite having earlier found that Emily had the right to move the
children to Lake Fork (as it was clearly within the 100-mile radius of Sweet), the trial court
terminated her primary custody and switched the children's primary custody to Jeff "at the
ranch" and directed that the children "continue to attend school in the Emmett school district"

2

Brownlee Road is the mountain road that starts north of Sweet (in Gem County) and comes
out at Gardena at Highway 55, just north of Horseshoe Bend. By that route, the ranch property is only
about 12 miles from Horseshoe Bend; ifyou go down to Highway 52, its still only 14 miles to
Horseshoe Bend, compared to 20 miles to Emmett from the ranch. See, Plaintiff's Exh. 217, Tr. Vol.
II, p. 396, L. 10.)
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despite the evidence that the ranch property (in Boise County) where Jeff lives is a 40-mile
daily round trip on mostly narrow mountain roads to the Emmett Schools the kids had been
attending. R. Vol. III, p. 416. The court also limited Emily's time to two weekends a month,
which was the schedule Jeff had received at the prior modification, despite the fact that neither
party had asked for her to be so limited and Jeff's pleadings had requested she have alternating
weekends. R. Vol. III, p. 416.
The trial court does not address or discuss at all the impact or significance of the "1 00mile" provision in the parties' original custody decree, but finds that Emily's move to live in
McCall constituted a "material, permanent and substantial change" because:
"it is to a different city, county, and school district, and because Emily's move
impacts the current visitation schedule by changing the exchange location, lenthening
the commute time of the parties for the exchange, and impacts Jeffs not scheduled
visitation with the boys."
R., Vol. III, p. 411 (emphasis added).
The court identified nothing even faintly negative about Emily's character or integrity,
found no abuse of any kind toward the children, found that "the boys have thrived under
[Emily's] custodial arrangement, finding stability in a structured and predictable visitation
routine ... The boys have formed strong bonds with their half siblings, Mr. Suter [step-dad],
[and] his children... " R. Vol. III, p. 412. The court finds that, despite the boys' "strong
bonds" with their siblings in Emily's home, "a change is [sic] primary custody will not
significantly impact those relationships." R. Vol. III, p. 414. The Court finds:
"There is no evidence that the boys' enthusiasm at being big brothers will diminish if
they do not primarily reside in McCall ... Under the [new] schedule, the boys will be
able to build upon these relationships during camping trips and family outings in the
summer months, as they did in the summer of2013, as well as scheduled weekend
visits to McCall."
BRIEF ON EXPEDITED APPEAL
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R. Vol. III, p. 414.

The trial court thus dismissed the established and successful primary custody exercised
by Emily, as of little weight compared to the importance ofthe boys' "historic ties to the
Emmett community." Id, at p. 413. There was no question that Jeff has a large extended
family, many of whom live in rural Gem and Boise County according to the evidence, and that
during his past summers, weekends and holidays, Jeff and his family do rodeos, brandings,
and "all the activities that Idaho ranch life has to offer" with the children. Id
But there was no testimony or evidence whatsoever to suggest that the kids' access to
these activities would actually diminish, because all witnesses' testimony about these events
were referring to times spent with the kids during Jeffs actual court-ordered parenting time.
Jeffs entire case at trial was to show it was going to be harder for him to go to the kid's
schools and school activities during Emily's custodial time if they were in McCall. See, e.g.,
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 208-209. Yet, despite this record that the only change from the kids going to
Lake Fork was a slightly longer commute to the exchange place for Jeff, the trial court
concluded:
Should the boys primary residence be McCall during the school year, such constant
and continual contact with Jeff outside of the custodian agreement would diminish due
to distance, logistics, and practicality. The move is not in the boys' best interest at is
[sic] would negatively impact their relationship with their father ... [T]he boys have
historically participated in several milestone events in the ranching community in the
Emmett area. The boys attend cattle brandings at various ranches in the Emmett area
with Jeff in the spring and participate in the cattleman's rodeo in early September.
Should the boys' primary residence be McCall, they would attend school in McCall.
The boys' ability to attend and actively participate in these Emmett area community
events that occur during the school year would be negatively impacted. As such, the
move is not in the boys' interest as it would negatively impact their historic ties to the
Emmett community."
R. Vol. III, p. 413 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the trial court placed significant weight on the children's attendance and
participation in 'ranch events' connected to Jeffs life, all of which had occurred historically
during his custodial time under the prior orders, and on the children's continued attendance of
school in Emmett, despite the fact that Jeffs Boise County ranch property cannot be regarded
as "close" to the former schools in Emmett-although it's somewhat closer than Emily's
home in Valley county. Id From Jeff's house, it's still at least a 40-mile round trip every day
for the kids to their schools, but the trial court makes no mention of that.
Rather, the trial court analyzed the case solely as a "relocation" and found that Emily
had not met a burden to show that relocation of the boys to Lake Fork was in their best
interests: "This Court finds that it is not in the boys' best interests to move to McCall, Idaho."
R. Vol. III, pp. 411-412,416.
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IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

The trial court entered temporary orders requiring Emily to return the children

to Emmett schools, despite their move to Lake Fork, but entered no findings of fact or
conclusions of law regarding the best interests of the children, and received no evidence
supporting the temporary order other than an affidavit of counsel.
2.

At trial, the Magistrate recognized Emily's right under the existing divorce

decree to move with the children within 100 miles of Sweet, Idaho, but then imposed a
relocation burden ofproofunder Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 64 P.3d 327 (2003), to
conclude the "move to McCall" is "not in the boys' best interests."
3.

The trial court didn't consider all relevant factors when it changed primary

custody in this case.
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ARGUMENT
I. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

This is a direct appeal from decisions of the magistrate court changing primary
residential custody of two children. In a review of discretionary custody decisions, the
Supreme Court directly reviews the record before the trial court in determining if the trial
court 1) correctly perceived the issues as discretionary; 2) acted within the outer boundaries of
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the choices before it; and
3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 187 P.3d
1234 (2008).
The Court further reviews the trial court's findings of fact, and will uphold them if
they are supported by substantial, competent evidence. !d.

II. THE TEMPORARY ORDERS WERE INCONSISTENT
WITH IDAHO LAW
The trial court's temporary orders, entered in August 2013, required Emily to return
the children to Emmett schools for the fall term pending trial. R. Vol. II, p. 343. Those orders
were inconsistent with Idaho law.
In Idaho, orders regarding custody are submitted to the sound discretion of the trial
court, and will be overturned only if there is an abuse of that discretion. However, a lack of
any findings of fact, or conclusions of law, or any references to evidence supporting the
court's exercise of discretion, as in this case, is not indicative of a sound exercise of
discretion. Schultz, supra, 145 Idaho at 863.
After Emily moved in May, 2013 to Lake Fork with the boys, they agreed to a new
exchange spot for transfers, and continued sharing parenting time back and forth under the
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existing order without incident. 3 Just before school was to start for the boys, however, Jeff
filed a motion for temporary orders. R. Vol. II, p. 268-284. He sought temporary custody for
himself, intending to re-enroll the kids in Emmett schools. !d. But the only evidence in
support of Jeffs motion was an affidavit ofhis attorney, Tim Fleming, which attached letters
between counsel, and earlier findings and conclusions entered in the 2012 modification action
by Judge Cockerille. R. Vol. II, pp. 275-284.
Emily filed an extensive Affidavit in Opposition, however, pointing out that her
residence was within the provisions of the parties' divorce decree which allowed her
specifically to move with the boys within the 100-mile radius of Sweet, the connections which
the boys had established in the McCall area over the three months there, their activities in Boy
Scouts, Church, Library programs, and football camp, at their new home, that she had inquired
about the kids continuing to attend in Emmett and had been turned down, that she had enrolled
them in McCall for school, and noting the kids' closeness to their half-siblings, Taylor (age
17), and Bridger (age one). R. Vol. II, pp. 290-292. Emily also pointed out that the exchange
location for Jeffs exercise of his parenting time had only changed by 8 miles from the prior
exchange location. !d.

3

The new exchange spot was only 8 additional miles for Jeffto drive from his ranch,
going the long way through Horseshoe Bend; there's a short way down to Highway 55 from
his place which comes out at Gardena, and saves 8-1 0 miles, meaning the distance is about the
same as he'd been driving before to get the kids a Black Canyon Dam. Tr. Vol II, p. 234, L.
21; Tr. Vol. II, p. 396, L. 12-p. 397, L. 9. The evidence at trial, and Emily's affidavit in opposition
to the temporary orders motion, showed that the parties had readily adjusted to the new exchange
spot-Smith's Ferry-and they'd followed the existing order without incident over that summer. R.,
Vol. II, p. 290-292 (Affidavit of Emily Suter); Tr. Vol. II, pp. 406-408; Plaintiffs Exhibit 215.
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After a brief telephone conference hearing, the trial court entered an "Order Re:
Temporary Orders" dated August 23, 2013, which directed that the children be "immediately
enrolled in and attend school in Emmett..." and "shall reside with the [Emily] in the Emmett
area while they attend school ... "unless otherwise agreed by Jeff. R. Vol. II, pp. 333-334.
The same day, after an Objection was filed by Emily, R. Vol. II, pp. 336-337, the court entered
an "Amended Temporary Order" which stated the same requirements for immediate school
enrollment, but removed the requirement of the children residing with Emily "in the Emmett
area." R. Vol. II, pp. 343-344.
As in the Schultz case, the trial court's bare order contains no reasoning or authority,
and no indication that the court perceived the issue as one of discretion, or analyzed the issue
regarding temporary custody in a manner consistent with Idaho Code Section 32-717. There,
the trial court had entered a similar temporary order, requiring a party who had left the state to
return or give up custody, without analysis or discussion other than a case citation. On appeal
the Court observes:
'"An abuse of discretion by the trial court occurs when the evidence is insufficient to
support its conclusion that the welfare and interests of a child will be best served by a
particular custody award."' [citations] It is also an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to over emphasize any one factor. [citation] All of the relevant factors
impacting the custody decision must be considered and reflected in the record."

Schultz, supra, 145 Idaho 863, 187 P.3d 1238.
Here, the trial court seemed to place sole emphasis on the fact that the children had
attended school in Emmett, and that appears to be the only factor considered. No mention is
made of the custody decree's language which specifically permitted movement of the children
within a 100-mile radius of Sweet, Idaho. No mention is made of the minimal impact on the
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father's commute (an eight-mile increase) to exchange the children. The temporary order is
not consistent with Idaho law as an abuse of discretion as it was unsupported by any record,
and was not the result of any reasoned analysis, and resulted from solely considering only one
factor-the children's prior school enrollment.
This is not a case where a parent has taken a child away out of state in violation of
another parent's custodial rights or claims, as was the case in Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho
624, 167 P.3d 761 (2007). In Hopper, the Court found the trial court to have abused its
discretion at the time of the temporary order hearing by allowing a parent to retain custody out
of state in violation ofldaho's criminal statutes. Here, the reverse has occurred, but its equally
flawed. The trial court refused to allow a parent to continue her lawful custody at her lawful
residence in McCall where she had moved with the children in a manner consistent with the
agreed custody orders in place at the time. 4 The result is Emily was forced to live "out of a
suitcase" with her parents in Boise, while communting her children to Emmett for school
during an entire fall semester. 5

4

The record does not reflect the existence of any injuntion or other temporary 'status quo'
order which would have prevented Emily from moving the children in May, 2013. As the record
makes clear, Jeff tried to hold Emily in contempt at trial for her McCall move, and this was explicitly
rejected by the trial court, saying essentially that Emily had the right to do what she did with the
children in May 2013. Tr. Vol. I, p. 66, ll. 2-6 ("There's been, again, no evidence that that [move to
McCall with the kids] is contrary to the Court's decree of divorce ... ")
5

In its findings and conclusions, the trial court expressed frustration that Emily had not
moved back to Emmett, or hadn't simply voluntarily relinquished custody to Jeff. The trial court
criticized Emily for doing what the temporary order forced her to do: "Instead of remaining within the
Emmett School District or permitting the boys to reside with Jeff during the week to ensure the minor
children maintain the current enrollment, Emily and the boys have been residing in her parents'.
basement in Boise, and transporting the minor children to school in Emmett on a daily basis." Finding
#13, R. Vol. III, p. 406-407. Plaintiff's Exh. 217, admitted at trial, showed that the distance was about
the same to get to Emmett, whether the kids were in northwest Boise with Emily, or at the Boise
County ranch property where Jeff lives.
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The temporary order was an abuse of the trial court's discretion and inconsistent with
Idaho law.

III. THIS IS NOT A RELOCATION CASE: THERE HAS
BEEN NO MOVE IN VIOLATION OF A PRIOR
CUSTODY ORDER
At trial, the Magistrate recognized Emily's right under the existing divorce decree to
move with the children within 100 miles of Sweet, Idaho, but then imposed a relocation
burden of proof under Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 64 P.3d 327 (2003), to conclude the
"move to McCall" is "not in the boys' best interests." This is not consistent with Idaho law.
The trial court cited to Roberts, but appears to have misapplied its lesson. The court in
Roberts specifically held that "when moving the minor children would violate an existing
custody arrangment, the parent seeking permission to relocate with minor children has the
burden of proving that the relocation is in the best interests of the minor children." 13 8 Idaho
at 405, 654 P .3d at 331. Here, Emily's move was not in violation of "an existing custody
arrangement" but in fact was recognized as being consistent with the existing orders. Yet, the
trial court does not discuss this issue at all.
Because there was no burden under the law on Emily to prove that the move to McCall
was in the kids' best interests, the trial court's imposition on Emily of such a burden was
improper. It was Jeffs burden to show that changing custody to him, under all the
circumstances of the case, was in the kids' best interests. All that Jeff (who is self-employed
on his family's ranch and apparently has no "boss" or set schedule) introduced was testimony
that it would be marginally more difficult for him to drive to the kids' schools if they're 80
miles away instead of20 miles away. But the record was clear that his court-ordered time was
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not impacted at all other than by an additional eight miles to go to the exchange place of
Smith's Ferry (compared to Black Canyon Dam), and it would be equivalent distance if he
takes the shortest route down to Gardena. So, since there's no more than a deminimus impact
on Jeff's actual custodial time because of the move, the trial court looks almost entirely at the
impact on Jeff's ability to spend time when it was not his allocated time under the custody
orders.
Jeff presented evidence that the kids enjoyed many of the 'ranching activities' which
the trial court noted, and that they were active in 4-H, boy scouts, church, rodeos, and sports.
But Emily's evidence showed clearly that the boys had the same opportunities, and interest, in
church, boy scouts, 4-H, and sports, up in Valley County, to the same if not a greater degree
than in Gem County. Tr. Vol. I, p. 109, L. 22-23; Tr. Vol. II, pp. 379-381. The trial court
doesn't identifY any distinguishing characteristics of the activities in Gem County to make
them 'better' other than that the kids had done them longer. Again and again, the trial court
comes back to the kids' perceived "historic ties to the Emmett community." R. Vol. III, p. 413.
But the reality of the court's decision, preferring a parent who is a 40-mile- round-trip outside
"the Emmett community" as better than their established custodian and primary parent in
McCall reflects a determination to regard "the move" as the central and primary factor in this
case.
Because Emily's move was not 'in violation of a previous custody arrangement'-and
in fact the trial court found it was not a violation- applying a burden on Emily to prove the
move in isolation was in the children's best interests, was error.
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS UNDER IDAHO
CODE 32-717 WAS FLAWED
The trial court overemphasized the factor of the move and the kids' perceived benefits
from staying in school in Emmett, Idaho. It also failed to consider several of the factors of
Idaho Code Section 32-717.
As discussed above, the trial court focused almost entirely on the perceived benefits of
attending school in Emmet, Idaho for these kids. There was no evidence of such a benefit,
compared to McCall schools, other than familiarity. Indeed, the court itself notes that "there's
no evidence of what, if any, educational opportunities are available to the boys in McCall that
are not in Emmett." R. Vol. III, p. 415. But this means the court was looking solely for
whether there was a specific benefit to the change-and that's rarely the case. What the law
requires is looking at the broad picture and all the factors.
'"This Court has previously held that Idaho law does not impose a presumption against
relocation. [Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449,457, 197 P.3d 310,318 (2008)] "'On the
contrary, when considered together, [previous cases] stand for the proposition that a
magistrate must consider all factors relevant to the child's best interest when making a
custody determination. A parent's move is only one factor to be considered when
awarding custody." !d. "An overemphasis on any single factor is also an abuse of
discretion." !d. at 458, 197 P.3d at 319.
Peterson v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 318,324,281 P.3d 1096, 1102 (2012).

The Peterson case is instructive here, as is Markwood v. Markwood, 152 Idaho 756,
274 P.3d 1271 (Ct App 2012). In Peterson, the trial court allowed a relocation of children out
of state, and the other parent appealed. The Court, as shown by the above quote, made clear
that a move is but one of the many factors to be considered by a trial court. In Markwood, the
facts are similar to the present case. The trial court there had a case before it which involved a
mother in Moscow, and father some 30 miles away, in Clarkston, Washington. The mother
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moved to central Oregon and wished to move the children there, as she was the established
custodian. The trial court correctly percived the issues and was quoted by the Court of
Appeals:
"The ideal situation ... was maybe [Amber] staying in Moscow. [The children] were
very well-adjusted here. They love Moscow. They love their friends here. That's not
the case that I get to decide. I have a very different case. That's not- that's not the case
I- that's not the choice I get to make."
Markwood, Id, at 760.
In the present matter, the trial court did not correctly perceive the issue and focused
entirely on one factor-the move. The trial court here made its decision based on where the
children's friends are, where their school was, and changed custody

to a parent who lives

only slightly closer to those friends and schools, but still a signficant distance away

almost

as if the Markwood magistrate had decided to switch custody to the father in Washington
state, and told him to keep the kids in school in Moscow.
Here, as well, the trial court did not consider two of the key factors under Idaho Code
32-717. The trial court focused almost entirely on "(d) The child's adjustment to his or her
horne, school, and community" and "(f) The need to promote continuity and stability in the
life of the child." Idaho Code 32-717. The trial court engaged in virtually no discussion at all
or consideration of two other key factors: "(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the
child with his or her parent or parents, and his or her siblings" and "(e) The character and
circumstances of all individuals involved." The court's only examination of the sibling and
family relationships was to find that the kids were closely bonded with their siblings in their
mother's horne, but that only seeing them for 4 days a month in the future "will not
significantly impact those relationships." R. Vol. III, p. 414. Moreover, the court's decision is
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devoid of discussion of factor (e), the parties' character and circumstances. Much
documentary evidence was presented of the often hateful text messages which Jeff
periodically unloads on Emily, and her efforts to respond. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Exhibit 212;
Defendant's Exhibit A. Judge Cockerille, in the parties' previous litigation, explicitly called
Jeffs behavior toward Emily "harassing and intimidating" (R. Vol. I, p. 137), while finding
that Emily had "always been the primary caregiver of the children" (R. p. 137) and Jeffs
conduct had been "foolish and immature" toward her. This factor was never discussed by the
trial court here, and the decision reflects this lack of balance.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the trial court's decision should be reversed and the matter
remanded for proceedings to return the children to their established primary parent, Emily
Suter.
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